GERMANY WELCOMES INDICTMENT... Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs Wolfgang Ischinger said in Bonn on 27
May that the German government "can only welcome this
action," Reuters reported. "This is the only way that we
can convince the Serbian people that they should not
feel tied to the Milosevic line for the future," he
added. Ischinger was speaking to representatives of some
30 countries who came to discuss a long-term "stability
pact" for the Balkans. PM

....BUT SERBIA DISMISSES IT. Branko Brankovic, who is
Belgrade's representative to the UN in Geneva, said on
27 May that the indictment by "a non-existing court" is
a ploy by NATO to sabotage peace efforts. Other Serbian
diplomats told the BBC that the indictment is further
"proof" that the Hague-based tribunal is a political
instrument to "demonize Serbs."

FRESH FIGHTING ALONG ALBANIAN BORDER. Serbian forces
shelled the village of Vlahen in the Has Mountains on 26
May, killing two people and damaging several buildings,
an RFE/RL correspondent reported from Tirana. Villagers
said that at least 15 artillery shells hit the village.
Serbian troops also used heavy artillery to fire on the
village of Padesh near Tropoja. Nearby, Serbian troops
entered Albanian territory at Kamenica. Albanian troops
exchanged fire with the intruders, who later withdrew.
RFE/RL's correspondent also reported heavy fighting at
the Morina border crossing. Officials of the Public
Order Ministry said that Serbian troops fired artillery
shells from a distance of eight to 10 kilometers into
the Albanian villages of Kishaj, Pogaj, and Cahani. NATO
planes later pounded Serbian positions in the White Drin
valley, Reuters reported. At the border crossings, the
influx of refugees has been reduced to a trickle. FS

SERBIAN ARMY ISSUES WARRANT FOR CACAK MAYOR. The
military authorities in Belgrade issued an arrest
warrant for Velimir Ilic, who is mayor of Cacak, for
"hampering the military in carrying out their duties"
and for "treason," the state-run daily "Politika"
reported on 26 May. The text added that his main offense
was to tell RFE/RL recently that the military had placed
tanks and other equipment near civilian buildings in
Cacak, which led to civilian deaths (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," 19 May 1999). In Krusevac, police took RFE/RL
correspondent Ljubisa Popovic to a police station on 26
May and told him that he will be detained for three
days, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service reported. And in
Belgrade, a military court began the trial of two
Australian aid workers on charges of spying. The court
turned down a request by their government that
Australian officials be present. In Canberra, Prime
Minister John Howard said he hopes the two will receive
a "fair trial."

---

The so called freedom of speech in Serbia.

Zoja

SCREWS TIGHTEN ON MONTENEGRO. Montenegrin aid officials
said in Podgorica on 26 May that Serbian authorities are
preventing refugee relief supplies from the West and
from Russia and Belarus from reaching Montenegro.
Elsewhere, the state oil company Jugopetrol imposed
limits on gasoline sales in Montenegro. Car owners will
be able to buy only 30 liters at any given time, while
the limit for bus and truck drivers is 50 liters.
Gasoline has recently become increasingly scarce in
Montenegro, Reuters reported.

---

You can do whatever you want, and say whatever you want to say in Yugoslavia.... DUH!

Sorry guys,

Tanjug and BETA had no comments on the above postings. I guess they are low on Slivovic by now.

Zoja

About Daniela's posting and somebodies comment she can not prove it; I can tell you that a large convoy of military vehicles drove through Slovenia and crossed the border with Hungary this morning. I have seen the pictures in both, Slovenian national television and a commercial television POP TV. It has been said, officialy, that they are going to have military practices in Hungary. You can choose to believe it, or not. And yes, the convoy entered our borders from Italy.

Bombing leaves pollution tragedy
Source: South China Morning Post

The Nato air strikes are threatening to cause widespread environmental damage in
the Balkans, with air and water pollution already reaching dangerously high levels in
nearby Bulgaria and Romania.

The United Nations has reported "serious environmental problems" in the region, and
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has confirmed that the bombings have led to
oil and chemical spills in the Danube River.

Bulgarian authorities last week reported an oil slick 8km long and 400 metres wide in
the northern region of Vidin, and the Romanian Environment Ministry said the level of
heavy metals in the Danube near the Yugoslav border had risen to alarming levels.

The Danube, Europe's most important waterway, flows on from Yugoslavia through
Romania and Bulgaria to the Black Sea.

Environmentalists fear the spills could damage the river's delicate delta ecosystem
over the long term, but one immediate threat posed by the Danube pollution is the
increased potential for a nuclear catastrophe.

The WWF's Danube expert, Peter Weller, said the danger lay in the fact that nuclear
power plants along the river, such as the Cernavoda plant in Romania, used river
water to cool the reactors.

Unless an alternate water source was found, the oil spills might lead to a blockage of
the plant's cooling systems - which could cause a nuclear meltdown, he said.

Bulgaria's Kozloduy nuclear plant faces another threat. Stray Nato bombs had come
dangerously close to hitting the power station, Stelios Psomas, of Greenpeace, said.

Bulgarian environmentalists had reported black soot particles in the air and on the
ground as a result of Nato's destruction of Yugoslav petrochemical plants near the
border, Greenpeace said.

"The real effects of this war will be seen a few years from now," the Greenpeace
specialist said.

(Copyright 1999)

_____via IntellX_____

Publication date: May 27, 1999

Thanks Ansen for the question about the topics.I will email a couple to you ASAP.

Emina

Reason #947! Why I Live in Santa Cruz!
http://www.rcnv.org/

Here it is all you fascist lovers!

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL

AGAINST

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
MILAN MILUTINOVIC
NIKOLA SAINOVIC
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC
VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC



INDICTMENT

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the Tribunal, charges:



SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
MILAN MILUTINOVIC
NIKOLA SAINOVIC
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC
VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC



with CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY and VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR as set forth below:



BACKGROUND

1. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is located in the southern part of the Republic of Serbia, a constituent republic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter FRY). The territory now comprising the FRY was part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY). The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is bordered on the north and north-west by the Republic of Montenegro, another constituent republic of the FRY. On the south-west, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is bordered by the Republic of Albania, and to the south, by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The capital of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is Pristina.

2. In 1990 the Socialist Republic of Serbia promulgated a new Constitution which, among other things, changed the names of the republic and the autonomous provinces. The name of the Socialist Republic of Serbia was changed to the Republic of Serbia (both hereinafter Serbia); the name of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo was changed to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (both hereinafter Kosovo); and the name of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina was changed to the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (hereinafter Vojvodina). During this same period, the Socialist Republic of Montenegro changed its name to the Republic of Montenegro (hereinafter Montenegro).

3. In 1974, a new SFRY Constitution had provided for a devolution of power from the central government to the six constituent republics of the country. Within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina were given considerable autonomy including control of their educational systems, judiciary, and police. They were also given their own provincial assemblies, and were represented in the Assembly, the Constitutional Court, and the Presidency of the SFRY.

4. In 1981, the last census with near universal participation, the total population of Kosovo was approximately 1,585,000 of which 1,227,000 (77%) were Albanians, and 210,000 (13%) were Serbs. Only estimates for the population of Kosovo in 1991 are available because Kosovo Albanians boycotted the census administered that year. General estimates are that the current population of Kosovo is between 1,800,000 and 2,100,000 of which approximately 85-90% are Kosovo Albanians and 5-10% are Serbs.

5. During the 1980s, Serbs voiced concern about discrimination against them by the Kosovo Albanian-led provincial government while Kosovo Albanians voiced concern about economic underdevelopment and called for greater political liberalisation and republican status for Kosovo. From 1981 onwards, Kosovo Albanians staged demonstrations which were suppressed by SFRY military and police forces of Serbia.

6. In April 1987, Slobodan MILOSEVIC, who had been elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986, travelled to Kosovo. In meetings with local Serb leaders and in a speech before a crowd of Serbs, Slobodan MILOSEVIC endorsed a Serbian nationalist agenda. In so doing, he broke with the party and government policy which had restricted nationalist expression in the SFRY since the time of its founding by Josip Broz Tito after the Second World War. Thereafter, Slobodan MILOSEVIC exploited a growing wave of Serbian nationalism in order to strengthen centralised rule in the SFRY.

7. In September 1987 Slobodan MILOSEVIC and his supporters gained control of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. In 1988, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was re-elected as Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. From that influential position, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was able to further develop his political power.

8. From July 1988 to March 1989, a series of demonstrations and rallies supportive of Slobodan MILOSEVIC’s policies -- the so-called "Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution" -- took place in Vojvodina and Montenegro. These protests led to the ouster of the respective provincial and republican governments; the new governments were then supportive of, and indebted to, Slobodan MILOSEVIC.

9. Simultaneously, within Serbia, calls for bringing Kosovo under stronger Serbian rule intensified and numerous demonstrations addressing this issue were held. On 17 November 1988, high-ranking Kosovo Albanian political figures were dismissed from their positions within the provincial leadership and were replaced by appointees loyal to Slobodan MILOSEVIC. In early 1989, the Serbian Assembly proposed amendments to the Constitution of Serbia which would strip Kosovo of most of its autonomous powers, including control of the police, educational and economic policy, and choice of official language, as well as its veto powers over further changes to the Constitution of Serbia. Kosovo Albanians demonstrated in large numbers against the proposed changes. Beginning in February 1989, a strike by Kosovo Albanian miners further increased tensions.

10. Due to the political unrest, on 3 March 1989, the SFRY Presidency declared that the situation in the province had deteriorated and had become a threat to the constitution, integrity, and sovereignty of the country. The government then imposed "special measures" which assigned responsibility for public security to the federal government instead of the government of Serbia.

11. On 23 March 1989, the Assembly of Kosovo met in Pristina and, with the majority of Kosovo Albanian delegates abstaining, voted to accept the proposed amendments to the constitution. Although lacking the required two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the President of the Assembly nonetheless declared that the amendments had passed. On 28 March 1989, the Assembly of Serbia voted to approve the constitutional changes effectively revoking the autonomy granted in the 1974 constitution.

12. At the same time these changes were occurring in Kosovo, Slobodan MILOSEVIC further increased his political power when he became the President of Serbia. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the Presidency of Serbia on 8 May 1989 and his post was formally confirmed on 6 December 1989.

13. In early 1990, Kosovo Albanians held mass demonstrations calling for an end to the "special measures." In April 1990, the SFRY Presidency lifted the "special measures" and removed most of the federal police forces as Serbia took over responsibility for police enforcement in Kosovo.

14. In July 1990, the Assembly of Serbia passed a decision to suspend the Assembly of Kosovo shortly after 114 of the 123 Kosovo Albanian delegates from that Assembly had passed an unofficial resolution declaring Kosovo an equal and independent entity within the SFRY. In September 1990, many of these same Kosovo Albanian delegates proclaimed a constitution for a "Republic of Kosovo." One year later, in September 1991, Kosovo Albanians held an unofficial referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly for independence. On 24 May 1992, Kosovo Albanians held unofficial elections for an assembly and president for the "Republic of Kosovo."

15. On 16 July 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia joined to form the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected its President. As the successor to the League of Communists, the SPS became the dominant political party in Serbia and Slobodan MILOSEVIC, as President of the SPS, was able to wield considerable power and influence over many branches of the government as well as the private sector. Milan MILUTINOVIC and Nikola SAINOVIC have both held prominent positions within the SPS. Nikola SAINOVIC was a member of the Main Committee and the Executive Council as well as a vice-chairman; and Milan MILUTINOVIC successfully ran for President of Serbia in 1997 as the SPS candidate.

16. After the adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia on 28 September 1990, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of Serbia in multi-party elections held on 9 and 26 December 1990; he was re-elected on 20 December 1992. In December 1991, Nikola SAINOVIC was appointed a Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia.

17. After Kosovo’s autonomy was effectively revoked in 1989, the political situation in Kosovo became more and more divisive. Throughout late 1990 and 1991 thousands of Kosovo Albanian doctors, teachers, professors, workers, police and civil servants were dismissed from their positions. The local court in Kosovo was abolished and many judges removed. Police violence against Kosovo Albanians increased.

18. During this period, the unofficial Kosovo Albanian leadership pursued a policy of non-violent civil resistance and began establishing a system of unofficial, parallel institutions in the health care and education sectors.

19. In late June 1991 the SFRY began to disintegrate in a succession of wars fought in the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter Slovenia), the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter Croatia), and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter Bosnia and Herzegovina). On 25 June 1991, Slovenia declared independence from the SFRY, which led to the outbreak of war; a peace agreement was reached on 8 July 1991. Croatia declared its independence on 25 June 1991, leading to fighting between Croatian military forces on the one side and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), paramilitary units and the "Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina" on the other.

20. On 6 March 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence, resulting in wide scale war after 6 April 1992. On 27 April 1992, the SFRY was reconstituted as the FRY. At this time, the JNA was re-formed as the Armed Forces of the FRY (hereinafter VJ). In the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the JNA, and later the VJ, fought along with the "Army of Republika Srpska" against military forces of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the "Croat Defence Council." Active hostilities ceased with the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995.

21. Although Slobodan MILOSEVIC was the President of Serbia during the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was nonetheless the dominant Serbian political figure exercising de facto control of the federal government as well as the republican government and was the person with whom the international community negotiated a variety of peace plans and agreements related to these wars.

22. Between 1991 and 1997 Milan MILUTINOVIC and Nikola SAINOVIC both held a number of high ranking positions within the federal and republican governments and continued to work closely with Slobodan MILOSEVIC. During this period, Milan MILUTINOVIC worked in the Foreign Ministry of the FRY, and at one time was Ambassador to Greece; in 1995, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRY, a position he held until 1997. Nikola SAINOVIC was Prime Minister of Serbia in 1993 and Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY in 1994.

23. While the wars were being conducted in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in Kosovo, while tense, did not erupt into the violence and intense fighting seen in the other countries. In the mid-1990s, however, a faction of the Kosovo Albanians organised a group known as Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK) or, known in English as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This group advocated a campaign of armed insurgency and violent resistance to the Serbian authorities. In mid-1996, the KLA began launching attacks primarily targeting FRY and Serbian police forces. Thereafter, and throughout 1997, FRY and Serbian police forces responded with forceful operations against suspected KLA bases and supporters in Kosovo.

24. After concluding his term as President of Serbia, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the FRY 15 July 1997, and assumed office on 23 July 1997. Thereafter, elections for the office of the President of Serbia were held; Milan MILUTINOVIC ran as the SPS candidate and was elected President of Serbia on 21 December 1997. In 1996, 1997 and 1998, Nikola SAINOVIC was re-appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY. In part through his close alliance with Milan MILUTINOVIC, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was able to retain his influence over the Government of Serbia.

25. Beginning in late February 1998, the conflict intensified between the KLA on the one hand and the VJ, the police forces of the FRY, police forces of Serbia, and paramilitary units (all hereinafter forces of the FRY and Serbia), on the other hand. A number of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were killed and wounded during this time. Forces of the FRY and Serbia engaged in a campaign of shelling predominantly Kosovo Albanian towns and villages, widespread destruction of property, and expulsions of the civilian population from areas in which the KLA was active. Many residents fled the territory as a result of the fighting and destruction or were forced to move to other areas within Kosovo. The United Nations estimates that by mid-October 1998, over 298,000 persons, roughly fifteen percent of the population, had been internally displaced within Kosovo or had left the province.

26. In response to the intensifying conflict, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1160 in March 1998 "condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo," and imposed an arms embargo on the FRY. Six months later the UNSC passed Resolution 1199 (1998) which stated that "the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region." The Security Council demanded that all parties cease hostilities and that "the security forces used for civilian repression" be withdrawn.

27. In an attempt to diffuse tensions in Kosovo, negotiations between Slobodan MILOSEVIC, and representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were conducted in October 1998. An "Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission" was signed on 16 October 1998. This agreement and the "Clark-Naumann agreement," which was signed by Nikola SAINOVIC, provided for the partial withdrawal of forces of the FRY and Serbia from Kosovo, a limitation on the introduction of additional forces and equipment into the area, and the deployment of unarmed OSCE verifiers.

28. Although scores of OSCE verifiers were deployed throughout Kosovo, hostilities continued. During this period, a number of killings of Kosovo Albanians were documented by the international verifiers and human rights organisations. In one such incident, on 15 January 1999, 45 unarmed Kosovo Albanians were murdered in the village of Racak in the municipality of Stimlje/Shtime.

29. In a further response to the continuing conflict in Kosovo, an international peace conference was organised in Rambouillet, France beginning on 7 February 1999. Nikola SAINOVIC, the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY, was a member of the Serbian delegation at the peace talks and Milan MILUTINOVIC, President of Serbia, was also present during the negotiations. The Kosovo Albanians were represented by the KLA and a delegation of Kosovo Albanian political and civic leaders. Despite intensive negotiations over several weeks, the peace talks collapsed in mid-March 1999.

30. During the peace negotiations in France, the violence in Kosovo continued. In late February and early March, forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a series of offensives against dozens of predominantly Kosovo Albanian villages and towns. The FRY military forces were comprised of elements of the 3rd Army, specifically the 52nd Corps, also known as the Pristina Corps, and several brigades and regiments under the command of the Pristina Corps. The Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, with command responsibilities over the 3rd Army and ultimately over the Pristina Corps, is Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC. The Supreme Commander of the VJ is Slobodan MILOSEVIC.

31. The police forces taking part in the actions in Kosovo are members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia in addition to some units from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the FRY. All police forces employed by or working under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia are commanded by Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia. Under the FRY Act on the Armed Forces, those police forces engaged in military operations during a state of war or imminent threat of war are subordinated to the command of the VJ whose commanders are Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC and Slobodan MILOSEVIC.

32. Prior to December 1998, Slobodan MILOSEVIC designated Nikola SAINOVIC as his representative for the Kosovo situation. A number of diplomats and other international officials who needed to speak with a government official regarding events in Kosovo were directed to Nikola SAINOVIC. He took an active role in the negotiations establishing the OSCE verification mission for Kosovo and he participated in numerous other meetings regarding the Kosovo crisis. From January 1999 to the date of this indictment, Nikola SAINCOVIC has acted as the liaison between Slobodan MILOSEVIC and various Kosovo Albanian leaders.

33. Nikola SAINOVIC was most recently re-appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY on 20 May 1998. As such, he is a member of the Government of the FRY, which, among other duties and responsibilities, formulates domestic and foreign policy, enforces federal law, directs and co-ordinates the work of federal ministries, and organises defence preparations.

34. During their offensives, forces of the FRY and Serbia acting in concert have engaged in a well-planned and co-ordinated campaign of destruction of property owned by Kosovo Albanian civilians. Towns and villages have been shelled, homes, farms, and businesses burned, and personal property destroyed. As a result of these orchestrated actions, towns, villages, and entire regions have been made uninhabitable for Kosovo Albanians. Additionally, forces of the FRY and Serbia have harassed, humiliated, and degraded Kosovo Albanian civilians through physical and verbal abuse. The Kosovo Albanians have also been persistently subjected to insults, racial slurs, degrading acts based on ethnicity and religion, beatings, and other forms of physical mistreatment.

35. The unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes in Kosovo involved well-planned and co-ordinated efforts by the leaders of the FRY and Serbia, and forces of the FRY and Serbia, all acting in concert. Actions similar in nature took place during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995. During those wars, Serbian military, paramilitary and police forces forcibly expelled and deported non-Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from areas under Serbian control utilising the same method of operations as have been used in Kosovo in 1999: heavy shelling and armed attacks on villages; widespread killings; destruction of non-Serbian residential areas and cultural and religious sites; and forced transfer and deportation of non-Serbian populations.

36. On 24 March 1999, NATO began launching air strikes against targets in the FRY. The FRY issued decrees of an imminent threat of war on 23 March 1999 and a state of war on 24 March 1999. Since the air strikes commenced, forces of the FRY and Serbia have intensified their systematic campaign and have forcibly expelled hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians.

37. In addition to the forced expulsions of Kosovo Albanians, forces of the FRY and Serbia have also engaged in a number of killings of Kosovo Albanians since 24 March 1999. Such killings occurred at numerous locations, including but not limited to, Bela Crkva, Mali Krusa/Krushe e Vogel -- Velika Krusa/Krushe e Mahde, Dakovica/Gjakovë , Crkovez/Padalishte, and Izbica.

38. The planning, preparation and execution of the campaign undertaken by forces of the FRY and Serbia in Kosovo, was planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted by Slobodan MILOSEVIC, the President of the FRY; Milan MILUTINOVIC, the President of Serbia; Nikola SAINOVIC, the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY; Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC, the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ; and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia.

39. By 20 May 1999, over 740,000 Kosovo Albanians, approximately one-third of the entire Kosovo Albanian population, were expelled from Kosovo. Thousands more are believed to be internally displaced. An unknown number of Kosovo Albanians have been killed in the operations by forces of the FRY and Serbia.



THE ACCUSED

40. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was born on 20 August 1941 in the town of Pozarevac in present-day Serbia. In 1964 he received a law degree from the University of Belgrade and began a career in management and banking. Slobodan MILOSEVIC held the posts of deputy director and later general director at Tehnogas, a major gas company until 1978. Thereafter, he became president of Beogradska banka (Beobanka), one of the largest banks in the SFRY and held that post until 1983.

41. In 1983 Slobodan MILOSEVIC began his political career. He became Chairman of the City Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade in 1984. In 1986 he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia and was re-elected in 1988. On 16 July 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia were united; the new party was named the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected its President. He holds the post of President of the SPS as of the date of this indictment.

42. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the Presidency of Serbia on 8 May 1989 and re-elected on 5 December that same year. After the adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia on 28 September 1990, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected to the newly established office of President of Serbia in multi-party elections held on 9 and 26 December 1990; he was re-elected on 20 December 1992.

43. After serving two terms as President of Serbia, Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the FRY on 15 July 1997 and he began his official duties on 23 July 1997. At all times relevant to this indictment, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has held the post of President of the FRY.

44. Milan MILUTINOVIC was born on 19 December 1942 in Belgrade in present-day Serbia. Milan MILUTINOVIC received a degree in law from Belgrade University.

45. Throughout his political career, Milan MILUTINOVIC has held numerous high level governmental posts within Serbia and the FRY. Milan MILUTINOVIC was a deputy in the Socio-Political Chamber and a member of the foreign policy committee in the Federal Assembly; he was Serbia’s Secretary for Education and Sciences, a member of the Executive Council of the Serbian Assembly, and a director of the Serbian National Library. Milan MILUTINOVIC also served as an ambassador in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as the FRY Ambassador to Greece. He was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRY on 15 August 1995. Milan MILUTINOVIC is a member of the SPS.

46. On 21 December 1997, Milan MILUTINOVIC was elected President of Serbia. At all times relevant to this indictment, Milan MILUTINOVIC has held the post of President of Serbia.

47. Nikola SAINOVIC was born on 7 December 1948 in Bor, Serbia. He graduated from the University of Ljubljana in 1977 and holds a Master of Science degree in Chemical Engineering. He began his political career in the municipality of Bor where he held the position of President of the Municipal Assembly of Bor from 1978 to 1982.

48. Throughout his political career, Nikola SAINOVIC has been an active member of both the League of Communists and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). He held the position of Chairman of the Municipal Committee of the League of Communists in Bor. On 28 November 1995, Nikola SAINOVIC was elected a member of the SPS’s Main Committee and a member of its Executive Council. He was also named president of the Committee to prepare the SPS Third Regular Congress (held in Belgrade on 2-3 March 1996). On 2 March 1996 Nikola SAINOVIC was elected one of several vice chairmen of the SPS. He held this position until 24 April 1997.

49. Nikola SAINOVIC has held several positions within the governments of Serbia and the FRY. In 1989, he served as a member of the Executive Council of Serbia’s Assembly and Secretary for Industry, Energetics and Engineering of Serbia in 1989. He was appointed Minister of Mining and Energy of Serbia on 11 February 1991, and again on 23 December 1991. On 23 December 1991, he was also named Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia. Nikola SAINOVIC was appointed Minister of the Economy of the FRY on 14 July 1992, and again on 11 September 1992. He resigned from this post on 29 November 1992. On 10 February 1993, Nikola SAINOVIC was elected Prime Minister of Serbia.

50. On 22 February 1994, Nikola SAINOVIC was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY. He was re-appointed to this position in three subsequent governments: on 12 June 1996, 20 March 1997 and 20 May 1998. Slobodan MILOSEVIC designated Nikola SAINOVIC as his representative for the Kosovo situation. Nikola SAINOVIC chaired the commission for co-operation with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo, and was an official member of the Serbian delegation at the Rambouillet peace talks in February 1999. At all times relevant to this indictment, Nikola SAINOVIC has held the post of Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY.

51. Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC was born on 1 June 1941 in the village of Ravni, near Uzice in what is now Serbia. In 1958, he completed the Infantry School for Non-Commissioned Officers and in 1964, he completed the Military Academy of the Ground Forces. In 1985, Dragoljub OJDANIC graduated from the Command Staff Academy and School of National Defence with a Masters Degree in Military Sciences. At one time he served as the Secretary for the League of Communists for the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) 52nd Corps, the precursor of the 52nd Corps of the VJ now operating in Kosovo.

52. In 1992, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC was the Deputy Commander of the 37th Corps of the JNA, later the VJ, based in Uzice, Serbia. He was promoted to Major General on 20 April 1992 and became Commander of the Uzice Corps. Under his command, the Uzice Corps was involved in military actions in eastern Bosnia during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1993 and 1994 Dragoljub OJDANIC served as Chief of the General Staff of the First Army of the FRY. He was Commander of the First Army between 1994 and 1996. In 1996, he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the VJ. On 26 November 1998, Slobodan MILOSEVIC appointed Dragoljub OJDANIC Chief of General Staff of the VJ, replacing General Momcilo Perisic. At all times relevant to this indictment, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC has held the post of Chief of the General Staff of the VJ.

53. Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC was born in Mala Krsna, in Serbia. He graduated from the University of Belgrade with a law degree, and then was employed at the municipal court. Thereafter, he became head of the Inter-Municipal Secretariat of Internal Affairs in Pozarevac. Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC has served as director of the PIK firm in Pozarevac, vice-president and president of the Economic Council of Yugoslavia, and president of the Economic Council of Serbia.

54. By April 1997, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC became Deputy Prime Minister of the Serbian Government and Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia. On 24 March 1998, the Serbian Assembly elected a new Government, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC was named Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia. He is also a member of the main board of the SPS. At all times relevant to this indictment, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, has held the post of Minister of Internal Affairs.



SUPERIOR AUTHORITY

55. Slobodan MILOSEVIC was elected President of the FRY on 15 July 1997, assumed office on 23 July 1997, and remains President as of the date of this indictment.

56. As President of the FRY, Slobodan MILOSEVIC functions as President of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY. The Supreme Defence Council consists of the President of the FRY and the Presidents of the member republics, Serbia and Montenegro. The Supreme Defence Council decides on the National Defence Plan and issues decisions concerning the VJ. As President of the FRY, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has the power to "order implementation of the National Defence Plan" and commands the VJ in war and peace in compliance with decisions made by the Supreme Defence Council. Slobodan MILOSEVIC, as Supreme Commander of the VJ, performs these duties through "commands, orders and decisions."

57. Under the FRY Act on the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, as Supreme Commander of the VJ, Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercises command authority over republican and federal police units subordinated to the VJ during a state of imminent threat of war or a state of war. A declaration of imminent threat of war was proclaimed on 23 March 1999, and a state of war on 24 March 1999.

58. In addition to his de jure powers, Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercises extensive de facto control over numerous institutions essential to, or involved in, the conduct of the offences alleged herein. Slobodan MILOSEVIC exercises extensive de facto control over federal institutions nominally under the competence of the Assembly or the Government of the FRY. Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercises de facto control over functions and institutions nominally under the competence of Serbia and its autonomous provinces, including the Serbian police force. Slobodan MILOSEVIC further exercises de facto control over numerous aspects of the FRY’s political and economic life, particularly the media. Between 1986 and the early 1990s, Slobodan MILOSEVIC progressively acquired de facto control over these federal, republican, provincial and other institutions. He continues to exercise this de facto control to this day.

59. Slobodan MILOSEVIC’s de facto control over Serbian, SFRY, FRY and other state organs has stemmed, in part, from his leadership of the two principal political parties that have ruled in Serbia since 1986, and in the FRY since 1992. From 1986 until 1990, he was Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists in Serbia, then the ruling party in Serbia. In 1990, he was elected President of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the successor party to the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia. The SPS has been the principal ruling party in Serbia and the FRY ever since. Throughout the period of his Presidency of Serbia, from 1990 to 1997, and as the President of the FRY, from 1997 to the present, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has also been the leader of the SPS.

60. Beginning no later than October 1988, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has exercised de facto control over the ruling and governing institutions of Serbia, including its police force. Beginning no later than October 1988, he has exercised de facto control over Serbia’s two autonomous provinces -- Kosovo and Vojvodina -- and their representation in federal organs of the SFRY and the FRY. From no later than October 1988 until mid-1998, Slobodan MILOSEVIC also exercised de facto control over the ruling and governing institutions of the Montenegro, including its representation in all federal organs of the SFRY and the FRY.

61. In significant international negotiations, meetings and conferences since 1989, Slobodan MILOSEVIC has been the primary interlocutor with whom the international community has negotiated. He has negotiated international agreements that have subsequently been implemented within Serbia, the SFRY, the FRY, and elsewhere on the territory of the former SFRY. Among the conferences and international negotiations at which Slobodan MILOSEVIC has been the primary representative of the SFRY and FRY are: The Hague Conference in 1991; the Paris negotiations of March 1993; the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in January 1993; the Vance-Owen peace plan negotiations between January and May 1993; the Geneva peace talks in the summer of 1993; the Contact Group meeting in June 1994; the negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9-14 September 1995; the negotiations to end the NATO bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-20 September 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995.

62. As the President of the FRY, the Supreme Commander of the VJ, and the President of the Supreme Defence Council, and pursuant to his de facto authority, Slobodan MILOSEVIC is responsible for the actions of his subordinates within the VJ and any police forces, both federal and republican, who have committed the crimes alleged in this indictment since January 1999 in the province of Kosovo.

63. Milan MILUTINOVIC was elected President of Serbia on 21 December 1997, and remains President as of the date of this indictment. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC is the head of State. He represents Serbia and conducts its relations with foreign states and international organisations. He organises preparations for the defence of Serbia.

64. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC is a member of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY and participates in decisions regarding the use of the VJ.

65. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC, in conjunction with the Assembly, has the authority to request reports both from the Government of Serbia, concerning matters under its jurisdiction, and from the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, concerning its activities and the security situation in Serbia. As President of Serbia, Milan MILUTINOVIC has the authority to dissolve the Assembly, and with it the Government, "subject to the proposal of the Government on justified grounds," although this power obtains only in peacetime.

66. During a declared state of war or state of imminent threat of war, Milan MILUTINOVIC, as President of Serbia, may enact measures normally under the competence of the Assembly, including the passage of laws; these measures may include the reorganisation of the Government and its ministries, as well as the restriction of certain rights and freedoms.

67. In addition to his de jure powers, Milan MILUTINOVIC exercises extensive de facto influence or control over numerous institutions essential to, or involved in, the conduct of the crimes alleged herein. Milan MILUTINOVIC exercises de facto influence or control over functions and institutions nominally under the competence of the Government and Assembly of Serbia and its autonomous provinces, including but not limited to the Serbian police force.

68. In significant international negotiations, meetings and conferences since 1995, Milan MILUTINOVIC has been a principal interlocutor with whom the international community has negotiated. Among the conferences and international negotiations at which Milan MILUTINOVIC has been a primary representative of the FRY are: preliminary negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15-21 August 1995; the Geneva meetings regarding the Bosnian cease fire, 7 September 1995; further negotiations for a cease fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9-14 September 1995; the negotiations to end the NATO bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14-20 September 1995; the meeting of Balkan foreign ministers in New York, 26 September 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995. Milan MILUTINOVIC was also present at the negotiations at Rambouillet in February 1999.

69. As the President of Serbia, and a member of the Supreme Defence Council, and pursuant to his de facto authority, Milan MILUTINOVIC is responsible for the actions of any of his subordinates within the VJ and within any police forces who have committed the crimes alleged in this indictment since January 1999 within the province of Kosovo.

70. Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the VJ on 26 November 1998. He remains in that position as of the date of this indictment. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC commands, orders, instructs, regulates and otherwise directs the VJ, pursuant to acts issued by the President of the FRY and as required to command the VJ.

71. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC determines the organisation, plan of development and formation of commands, units and institutions of the VJ, in conformity with the nature and needs of the VJ and pursuant to acts rendered by the President of the FRY.

72. In his position of authority, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC also determines the plan for recruiting and filling vacancies within the VJ and the distribution of recruits therein; issues regulations concerning training of the VJ; determines the educational plan and advanced training of professional and reserve military officers; and performs other tasks stipulated by law.

73. As Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC -- or other officers empowered by him -- assigns commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and promotes non-commissioned officers, reserve officers, and officers up to the rank of colonel. In addition, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC nominates the president, judges, prosecutors, and their respective deputies and secretaries, to serve on military disciplinary courts.

74. Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC carries out preparations for the conscription of citizens and mobilisation of the VJ; co-operates with the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the FRY and Serbia and the Ministry of Defence of the FRY in mobilising organs and units of Ministries of Internal Affairs; monitors and, proposes measures to correct problems encountered during, and informs the Government of the FRY and the Supreme Defence Council about the implementation of the aforementioned mobilisation.

75. As the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ , Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC is responsible for the actions of his subordinates within the VJ and for the actions of any federal and republican police forces, which are subordinated to the VJ, who have committed crimes since January 1999 within the province of Kosovo.

76. Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC was named Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia on 24 March 1998. As head of a Serbian government ministry, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC is responsible for the enforcement of laws, regulations and general acts promulgated by Serbia’s Assembly, Government or President.

77. As Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC directs the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its personnel. He determines the structure, mandate and scope of operations of organisational units within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He is empowered to call up members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reserve corps to perform duties during peace time, and to prevent activities threatening Serbia’s security. The orders which he and Ministry of Internal Affairs superior officers issue to Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel are binding unless they constitute a criminal act.

78. As Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC has powers of review over decisions and acts of agents for the Ministry. He considers appeals against decisions made in the first instance by the head of an organisational unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, he is empowered to decide appeals made by individuals who have been detained by the police.

79. On 8 April 1999, as Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC’s powers during the state of war were expanded to include transferring Ministry employees to different duties within the Ministry for as long as required.

80. As Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of law and order in Serbia. As Minister of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the actions of his subordinates within the police forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia who have committed crimes since January 1999 in the province of Kosovo.



GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

81. At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of armed conflict existed in Kosovo in the FRY.

82. All acts and omissions charged as crimes against humanity were part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population of Kosovo in the FRY.

83. Each of the accused is individually responsible for the crimes alleged against him in this indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute. Individual criminal responsibility includes committing, planning, instigating, ordering or aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Tribunal Statute.

84. In as much as he has authority or control over the VJ and police units, other units or individuals subordinated to the command of the VJ in Kosovo, Slobodan MILOSEVIC, as President of the FRY, Supreme Commander of the VJ and President of the Supreme Defence Council, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, including members of the VJ and aforementioned employees of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the FRY and Serbia, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute.

85. In as much as he has authority or control over police units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the VJ, or police units, other units or individuals subordinated to the command of the VJ in Kosovo, Milan MILUTINOVIC, as President of Serbia and a member of the Supreme Defence Council, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, including aforementioned employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute.

86. In as much as he has authority or control over the VJ and police units, other units or individuals subordinated to the command of the VJ in Kosovo, Colonel General Dragoljub OJDANIC, as Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, including members of the VJ and aforementioned employees of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of Serbia and the FRY, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute.

87. In as much as he has authority or control over employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including any other regular or mobilised police units, Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, as Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, including employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute.

88. A superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinate(s) if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate(s) was/were about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

89. The general allegations contained in paragraphs 81 through 88 are re-alleged and incorporated into each of the charges set forth below.



CHARGES

COUNTS 1 - 4
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR

90. Beginning in January 1999 and continuing to the date of this indictment, Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in a campaign of terror and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians living in Kosovo in the FRY.

91. The campaign of terror and violence directed at the Kosovo Albanian population was executed by forces of the FRY and Serbia acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC. The operations targeting the Kosovo Albanians were undertaken with the objective of removing a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the province. To achieve this objective, the forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting in concert, have engaged in well-planned and co-ordinated operations as described in paragraphs 92 through 98 below.

92. The forces of the FRY and Serbia, have in a systematic manner, forcibly expelled and internally displaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes across the entire province of Kosovo. To facilitate these expulsions and displacements, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have intentionally created an atmosphere of fear and oppression through the use of force, threats of force, and acts of violence.

93. Throughout Kosovo, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have looted and pillaged the personal and commercial property belonging to Kosovo Albanians forced from their homes. Policemen, soldiers, and military officers have used wholesale searches, threats of force, and acts of violence to rob Kosovo Albanians of money and valuables, and in a systematic manner, authorities at FRY border posts have stolen personal vehicles and other property from Kosovo Albanians being deported from the province.

94. Throughout Kosovo, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have engaged in a systematic campaign of destruction of property owned by Kosovo Albanian civilians. This has been accomplished through the widespread shelling of towns and villages; the burning of homes, farms, and businesses; and the destruction of personal property. As a result of these orchestrated actions, villages, towns, and entire regions have been made uninhabitable for Kosovo Albanians.

95. Throughout Kosovo, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have harassed, humiliated, and degraded Kosovo Albanian civilians through physical and verbal abuse. Policemen, soldiers, and military officers have persistently subjected Kosovo Albanians to insults, racial slurs, degrading acts, beatings, and other forms of physical mistreatment based on their racial, religious, and political identification.

96. Throughout Kosovo, the forces of the FRY and Serbia have systematically seized and destroyed the personal identity documents and licenses of vehicles belonging to Kosovo Albanian civilians. As Kosovo Albanians have been forced from their homes and directed towards Kosovo’s borders, they have been subjected to demands to surrender identity documents at selected points en route to border crossings and at border crossings into Albania and Macedonia. These actions have been undertaken in order to erase any record of the deported Kosovo Albanians’ presence in Kosovo and to deny them the right to return to their homes.

97. Beginning on or about 1 January 1999 and continuing until the date of this indictment, the forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC have perpetrated the actions set forth in paragraphs 92 through 96, which have resulted in the forced deportation of approximately 740,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians. These actions have been undertaken in all areas of Kosovo, and these means and methods were used throughout the province, including the following municipalities:

a. Dakovica/Gjakovë : On or about 2 April 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia began forcing residents of the town of Dakovica/Gjakovë to leave. Forces of the FRY and Serbia spread out through the town and went house to house ordering Kosovo Albanians from their homes. In some instances, people were killed, and most persons were threatened with death. Many of the houses and shops belonging to Kosovo Albanians were set on fire, while those belonging to Serbs were protected. During the period from 2 to 4 April 1999, thousands of Kosovo Albanians living in Dakovica/Gjakovë and neighbouring villages joined a large convoy, either on foot or driving in cars, trucks and tractors, and moved to the border with Albania. Forces of the FRY and Serbia directed those fleeing along pre-arranged routes, and at police checkpoints along the way most Kosovo Albanians had their identification papers and license plates seized. In some instances, Yugoslav army trucks were used to transport persons to the border with Albania.

b. Gnjilane/Gjilan: Forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the town of Prilepnica/Pë rlepnicë on or about 6 April 1999, and ordered residents to leave saying that the town would be mined the next day. The townspeople left and tried to go to another village but were turned back by police. On 13 April 1999, residents of Prilepnica/Pë rlepnicë were again informed that the town had to be evacuated by the following day. The next morning, the Kosovo Albanian residents left in a convoy of approximately 500 vehicles and headed to the Macedonian border. Shortly after the residents left, the houses in Prilepnica/Pë rlepnicë were set on fire. Kosovo Albanians in other villages in Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality were also forced from their homes, and were made to join another convoy to the Macedonian border. Along the way, some men were taken from the convoy and killed along the road. When the Kosovo Albanians reached the border, their identification papers were confiscated.

c. Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovicë : In late March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia began moving systematically through the town of Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovicë . They entered the homes of Kosovo Albanians and ordered the residents to leave their houses at once and to go to the bus station. Some houses were set on fire forcing the residents to flee to other parts of the town. Over a two week period the forces of the FRY and Serbia continued to expel the Kosovo Albanian residents of the town. During this period, properties belonging to Kosovo Albanians were destroyed and Kosovo Albanians were robbed of money, vehicles, and other valuables. A similar pattern was repeated in other villages in the Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovicë municipality, where Kosovo Albanians were forced from their homes, followed by the destruction of their villages by forces of the FRY and Serbia. The Kosovo Albanian residents of the municipality were forced to join convoys going to the Albanian border. En route to the border, Serb soldiers, policemen, and military officers robbed them of valuables and seized their identity documents.

d. Orahovac/Rahovec: On the morning of 25 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the village of Celine with tanks and armoured vehicles. After shelling the village, troops entered the village and systematically looted and pillaged everything of value from the houses. Most of the Kosovo Albanian villagers had fled to a nearby forest before the army and police arrived. On 28 March, a number of Serb police forced the thousands of people hiding in the forest to come out. After marching the civilians to a nearby village, the men were separated from the women and were beaten, robbed, and had all of their identity documents taken from them. The men were then marched to Prizren and eventually forced to go to the Albanian border.

On 25 March 1999, a large group of Kosovo Albanians went to a mountain near the village of Nagafc, also in Orahovac/Rahovec municipality, seeking safety from attacks on nearby villages. Forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded them and on the following day, ordered the 8,000 people who had sought shelter on the mountain to leave. The Kosovo Albanians were forced to go to a nearby school and then they were forcibly dispersed into nearby villages. After three or four days, the forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the villages, went house to house and ordered people out. Eventually, they were forced back into houses and told not to leave. Those who could not fit inside the houses were forced to stay in cars and tractors parked nearby. On 2 April 1999, the forces of the FRY and Serbia started shelling the villages, killing a number of people who had been sleeping in tractors and cars. Those who survived headed for the Albanian border. As they passed through other Kosovo Albanian villages, which had been destroyed, they were taunted by Serb soldiers. When the villagers arrived at the border, all their identification papers were taken from them.

e. Pec/Pejë : On 27 and 28 March 1999, in the city of Pec/Pejë , forces of the FRY and Serbia went from house to house forcing Kosovo Albanians to leave. Some houses were set on fire and a number of people were shot. Soldiers and police were stationed along every street directing the Kosovo Albanians toward the town centre. Once the people reached the centre of town, those without cars or vehicles were forced to get on buses or trucks and were driven to the town of Prizren. Outside Prizren, the Kosovo Albanians were forced to get off the buses and walk approximately 40 kilometres to the Albanian border where they were ordered to turn their identification papers over to Serb policemen.

f. Pristina/Prishtinë : On or about 1 April 1999, Serbian police went to the homes of Kosovo Albanians in the city of Pristina/Prishtinë and forced the residents to leave in a matter of minutes. During the course of these forced expulsions, a number of people were killed. Many of those forced from their homes went directly to the train station, while others sought shelter in nearby neighbourhoods. Hundreds of ethnic Albanians, guided by Serb police at all the intersections, gathered at the train station and then were loaded onto overcrowded trains or buses after a long wait where no food or water was provided. Those on the trains went as far as General Jankovic, a village near the Macedonian border. During the train ride many people had their identification papers taken from them. After getting off the trains, the Kosovo Albanians were told by the Serb police to walk along the tracks into Macedonia since the surrounding land had been mined. Those who tried to hide in Pristina/Prishtinë were expelled a few days later in a similar fashion.

During the same period, forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the villages of Pristina/Prishtinë municipality where they beat and killed many Kosovo Albanians, robbed them of their money, looted their property and burned their homes. Many of the villagers were taken by truck to Glogovac in the municipality of Lipljan/Lipjan. From there, they were transported to General Jankovic by train and walked to the Macedonian border. Others, after making their way to the town of Urosevac/Ferizaj, were ordered by the Serb police to take a train to General Jankovic, from where they walked across the border into Macedonia.

g. Prizren: On 25 March 1999 the village of Pirana was surrounded by forces of the FRY and Serbia, tanks and various military vehicles. The village was shelled and a number of the residents were killed. Thereafter, police entered the village and burned the house of Kosovo Albanians. After the attack, the remaining villagers left Pirana and went to surrounding villages. Some of the Kosovo Albanians fleeing toward Srbica were killed or wounded by snipers. Serb forces then launched an offensive in the area of Srbica and shelled the villages of Reti e Utlet, Reti and Randobrava. Kosovo Albanian villagers were forced from their homes and sent to the Albanian border. From 28 March 1999, in the city of Prizren itself, Serb policemen went from house to house, ordering Kosovo Albanian residents to leave. They were forced to join convoys of vehicles and persons travelling on foot to the Albanian border. At the border all personal documents were taken away by Serb policemen.

h. Srbica/Skenderaj: On or about 25 March 1999, the villages of Vojnik, Lecina, Klladernica, Turiqevc Broje and Izbica were destroyed by shelling and burning. A group of approximately 4,500 Kosovo Albanians from these villages gathered outside the village of Izbica where members of the forces of the FRY and Serbia demanded money from the group and separated the men from the women and children. A large number of the men were then killed. The surviving women and children were moved as a group towards Vojnik and then on to the Albanian border.

i. Suva Reka/Suharekë : On the morning of 25 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the town of Suva Reka/Suharekë . During the following days, police officers went from house to house, threatening Kosovo Albanian residents, and removing many of the people from their homes at gunpoint. The women, children and elderly were sent away by the police and then a number of the men were killed by the Forces of the FRY and Serbia. The Kosovo Albanians were forced to flee making their way in trucks, tractors and trailers towards the border with Albania. While crossing the border, they had all their documents and money taken.

On 31 March 1999, approximately 80,000 Kosovo Albanians displaced from villages in the Suva Reka/Suharekë municipality gathered near Bellanice. The following day, forces of the FRY and Serbia shelled Bellanice, forcing the displaced persons to flee toward the Albanian border. Prior to crossing the border, they had all their identification documents taken away.

j. Urosevac/Ferizaj: During the period between 4 and 14 April 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia shelled the villages of Softaj, Rahovica, Zltara, Pojatista, Komoglava and Sojevo, killing a number of residents. After the shelling, police and military vehicles entered the villages and ordered the residents to leave. After the villagers left their houses, the soldiers and policemen burned the houses. The villagers that were displaced joined in a convoy to the Macedonian border. At the border, all of their documents were taken.

98. Beginning on or about 1 January 1999 and continuing until the date of this indictment, forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC, Dragoljub OJDANIC, and Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, have murdered hundreds of Kosovo Albanian civilians. These killings have occurred in a widespread or systematic manner throughout the province of Kosovo and have resulted in the deaths of numerous men, women, and children. Included among the incidents of mass killings are the following:

a. On or about 15 January 1999, in the early morning hours, the village of Racak (Stimlje/Shtime municipality) was attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia. After shelling by the VJ units, the Serb police entered the village later in the morning and began conducting house-to-house searches. Villagers, who attempted to flee from the Serb police, were shot throughout the village. A group of approximately 25 men attempted to hide in a building, but were discovered by the Serb police. They were beaten and then were removed to a nearby hill, where the policemen shot and killed them. Altogether, the forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 45 Kosovo Albanians in and around Racak. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule A, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

b. On or about 25 March 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked the village of Bela Crkva (Orahovac/Rahovec municipality). Many of the residents of Bela Crkva fled into a streambed outside the village and sought shelter under a railroad bridge. As additional villagers approached the bridge, a Serbian police patrol opened fire on them killing 12 persons, including 10 women and children. The police then ordered the remaining villagers out of the streambed, at which time the men were separated from the women and small children. The police ordered the men to strip and then systematically robbed them of all valuables. The women and children were then ordered to leave. The village doctor attempted to speak with the police commander, but he was shot and killed, as was his nephew. The other men were then ordered back into the streambed. After they complied, the police opened fire on the men, killing approximately 65 Kosovo Albanians. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule B which is attached as an appendix to the indictment.)

c. On or about 25 March 1999, the villages of Velika Krusa and Mali Krusa/Krushe e Mahde and Krushe e Vogel (Orahovac/Rahovec municipality) were attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia. Village residents took refuge in a forested area outside Velika Krusa/Krushe e Mahde, where they were able to observe the police systematically looting and then burning the villagers’ houses. On or about the morning of 26 March 1999, Serb police located the villagers in the forest. The police ordered the women and small children to leave the area and to go to Albania. The police then searched the men and boys and took their identity documents, after which they were made to walk to an uninhabited house between the forest and Mali Krusa/Krushe e Vogel. Once the men and boys were assembled inside the house, the Serb police opened fire on the group. After several minutes of gunfire, the police piled hay on the men and boys and set fire to it in order to burn the bodies. As a result of the shootings and the fire, approximately 105 Kosovo Albanian men and boys were killed by the Serb police. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule C which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

d. On or about the evening of 26 March 1999, in the town of Dakovica/Gjakovë , Serb gunmen came to a house on Ymer Grezda Street. The women and children inside the house were separated from the men, and were ordered to go upstairs. The Serb gunmen then shot and killed the 6 Kosovo Albanian men who were in the house. (The names of those killed are set forth in Schedule D which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

e. On or about 27 March 1999, in the morning hours, forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked the village of Crkolez/Padalishte (Istok/Istog municipality). As the forces entered the village, they fired on houses and on villagers who attempted to flee. Eight members of the Beke IMERAJ family were forced from their home and were killed in front of their house. Other residents of Crkolez/Padalishte were killed at their homes and in a streambed near the village. Altogether, forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 20 Kosovo Albanians from Crkolez/Padalishte. (Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule E which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.)

f. On or about 27 March 1999, FRY and Republic of Serbia forces attacked the village of Izbica (Srbica/Skenderaj municipality). Several tho

You Godless Serbian supporters on this site are just as guilty as the scum that perpetrated these crimes. The ones of you who were brainwashed by the communist system in your youth can at least use that as an excuse, but the ones of you who willingly support these Serbian scum and weren't brainwashed are the lowest form of life on the earth. May God have mercy on your corrupted, evil souls.

P.S.
You all make me want to puke.

Press Release · Communiqué de presse

(Exclusively for the use of the media. Not an official document)

The Hague, 27 May 1999

JL/PIU/403-E

PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC
AND FOUR OTHER SENIOR FRY OFFICIALS
INDICTED FOR MURDER, PERSECUTION AND DEPORTATION
IN KOSOVO



Today, Thursday 27 May 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has announced the indictment of, and has issued warrants of arrests against:

- Slobodan MILOSEVIC, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),
- Milan MILUTINOVIC, the President of Serbia,
- Nikola SAINOVIC, Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY,
- Dragoljub OJDANIC, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army,
- Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC, Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia.

This follows the confirmation by Judge David Hunt, on Monday 24 May 1999, of an indictment against the five accused submitted on 22 May 1999 by the Prosecutor, Justice Louise Arbour. Judge Hunt granted the Prosecutor’s request for delayed disclosure of the indictment and the arrest warrants until today. The latter and other related orders were transmitted at noon today to the Federal Minister of Justice of the FRY, all United Nations Member States and the Confederation of Switzerland.

The United Nations Member States were also ordered to make inquiries to discover whether any of the accused had assets located in their territory and, if so, to freeze such assets until the accused are taken into custody.

As pointed out by Justice Arbour in her application to Judge Hunt, "this indictment is the first in the history of this Tribunal to charge a Head of State during an on-going armed conflict with the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law".

The indictment alleges that, between 1 January and late May 1999, forces under the control of the five accused persecuted the Kosovo Albanian civilian population on political, racial or religious grounds. By the date of the indictment, approximately 740,000 Kosovo Albanians, about one-third of the entire Kosovo Albanian population, had been expelled from Kosovo. Thousands more are believed to be internally displaced. An unknown number of Kosovo Albanians have been killed in the operations by forces of the FRY and Serbia. Specifically, the five indictees are charged with the murder of over 340 persons identified by name in an annex to the indictment.

Each of the accused is charged with three counts of crimes against humanity and one count of violations of the laws or customs of war.



Background on the indictment

The indictment against the accused was submitted on 22 May 1999. It alleges that, between 1 January 1999 and late May 1999, the military forces and some police units of the FRY, the police force of Serbia and associated paramilitary units jointly engaged in a widespread and systematic series of offensives against many towns and villages predominantly inhabited by Albanians in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo in the southern part of the Republic of Serbia, FRY.

It is alleged that hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian civilians were expelled from the Province by forced removal from, and subsequent looting and destruction of, their homes, or by the shelling of villages. Surviving residents were sent to the borders of neighbouring countries. En route many were killed, abused and had their possessions and identification papers stolen. Furthermore, specific massacres in villages such as Racak, Bela Crkva, Velika Kruse, Mali Krusa, Djakovica, Crkolez, and Izbica are also covered by the indictment.

These alleged factual events are underlying the four counts in the indictment charging the accused with:

Murder, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 5(a) of the Statute, and also a violation of the laws or customs of war, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute (namely a violation of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions);
Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5(h) of the Statute the Tribunal; and
Deportation, a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 5(d) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
All accused are charged with individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute. By virtue of their high positions of power, the accused Milosevic, Milutinovic, Ojdanic and Stojiljkovic are also, or alternatively, charged with superior criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute. The case against each of these four accused is based on both their legal and de facto relationship with the military and police forces mentioned above.



Background on the related orders

In addition to confirming all counts in the indictment, Judge Hunt also ordered, further to requests by the Prosecutor, that:

Certified copies of the arrest warrants be transmitted to:

The Federal Minister of Justice of the FRY, Mr. Zoran Knezevic, as the most appropriate person in authority to execute the arrest warrants;
All UN Member States and the Confederation of Switzerland, pursuant to Sub-rule 55(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
The Prosecutor, so she may seek the assistance of the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL).
In order to ensure the safety of persons within or close to the FRY, such as staff of the Office of the Prosecutor or other United Nations, Governmental and humanitarian agencies, pursuant to Rule 53, the indictment, the review and confirmation of the indictment, the arrest warrants and the Prosecutor’s application not be disclosed before today, 27 May 1999, at noon, unless otherwise ordered. However, the Prosecutor was allowed beforehand to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and those Governments whose personnel are at risk of reprisals or intimidation.

In order to protect the witnesses whose evidence was submitted in support of the indictment, pursuant to Sub-rule 47(B), there be no disclosure of the supporting material until the arrest of all of the accused.

Lastly, pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Statute and Rule 54, all UN Member States inquire whether any of the accused’s assets are located in their territories, and, if so, to provisionally freeze such assets until the accused are taken into custody. This measure, which is without prejudice to the rights of third parties, was taken in light of the consistent non-co-operation of the FRY with the Tribunal and the possibility that such assets be used to evade arrest.

Press Release · Communiqué de presse

(Exclusively for the use of the media. Not an official document)

The Hague, 27 May 1999

JL/PIU/404-E

STATEMENT BY JUSTICE LOUISE ARBOUR, PROSECUTOR ICTY



On May 22, I presented an indictment for confirmation against Slobodan Milosevic and four others charging them with crimes against humanity - specifically murder, deportation and persecutions, and with violations of the laws and customs of war. The indictment was confirmed by a Judge of this Tribunal on May 24. The indictment was the subject of a non-disclosure order which expired at noon today. I sought this order on the basis of security considerations, in particular for the UN humanitarian mission which left the former Yugoslavia this morning.

The following accused are jointly indicted:

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

MILAN MILUTINOVIC, President of the Republic of Serbia,

NIKOLA SAINOVIC, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and

VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia.

Arrests warrants have been issued against all five accused and are being served on all Member States of the United Nations and Switzerland. The warrants are accompanied by a court order requesting all States to search for and freeze any and all assets of the accused under their jurisdiction. This order was sought to prevent foreign assets being used for the purpose of evading justice, and to permit effective restitution to be made upon conviction. These provisional measures are granted without prejudice to the rights of third parties.

This indictment is the product of intense efforts by a large number of people in my Office. It does not represent the totality of the charges that may result from our continuing investigations of these accused, nor does it represent our final determination of the responsibility of others in relation to the same events. The present indictment is based exclusively on crimes committed since the beginning of 1999 in Kosovo. We are continuing to develop an evidentiary base upon which I believe we will be able to expand upon the present charges. We are still actively investigating other incidents in Kosovo, as well as the role of the accused, or of some of them, in Croatia and Bosnia in earlier years. We are also still investigating the role and responsibility of others into the crimes contained in this indictment.

Although this broad investigation is on-going, we had reached a point, at the end of last week where, in my view, we had sufficient evidence of these very serious offences committed by these accused to require us to bring these charges at this stage. As usual, this indictment was the subject of thorough scrutiny within the Office of the Prosecutor before being submitted to a Judge for confirmation. In order to have the indictment confirmed, the Prosecutor must present a prima facie case. In his decision confirming the indictment, Judge David Hunt said:

"A prima facie case on any particular charge exists in this situation where the material facts pleaded in the indictment constitute a credible case which would (if not contradicted by the accused) be a sufficient basis to convict him of that charge."

We have received, and we are continuing to receive valuable information from governments, as well as from groups and individuals. We are still awaiting further evidence that I believe many States will be able to contribute to our larger investigation. I repeat my pressing call to them to come forward and be responsive to our outstanding and future Requests for Assistance in relation to evidence in their possession.

I also call upon all States to comply with the execution of these, and all outstanding arrests warrants issued by the Tribunal. These warrants are issued under the authority of a Security Council resolution, which requires all States to comply with the orders of the Tribunal. I call in particular on the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and especially on the Minister of Justice, to stand up for the Rule of Law, and to request that all the accused voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, or, should they fail to do so, to provide for their arrest and transfer to The Hague.

I have been stressing for several months now our commitment to functioning as a real time law enforcement operation. I believe that it is an extraordinary achievement, by any law enforcement standard, for us to have brought to successful confirmation, an indictment against the five accused, for crimes of this magnitude committed since the beginning of this year. This has been achieved in less than five months, under the demanding requirements of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which compel the production to a Judge of detailed supporting materials to substantiate the charges. The supporting materials, which contain witness statements and relevant documents, which were filed with the Registry, will not be disclosed until the accused appear to answer the charges.

Finally, I am mindful of the impact that this indictment may have on the peace process in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I am confident, as was obviously the Security Council in creating this Tribunal and in calling upon it several times in the last year to address this issue, that the product of our work will make a major contribution to a lasting peace, not only in Kosovo, but in the whole region in which we have jurisdiction. No credible, lasting peace can be built upon impunity and injustice. The refusal to bring war criminals to account would be an affront to those who obey the law, and a betrayal of those who rely on it for their life and security.

Although the accused are entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence until they are convicted, the evidence upon which this indictment was confirmed raises serious questions about their suitability to be the guarantors of any deal, let alone a peace agreement. They have not been rendered less suitable by the indictment. The indictment has simply exposed their unsuitability.

An independent review by a Judge of this Tribunal has confirmed that there is a credible basis to believe that these accused are criminally responsible for the deportation of 740,000 Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo, and for the murder of over 340 identified Kosovo Albanians. The victims were entitled to expect protection from each one of these accused.

This indictment is directed against the five named accused. It is not directed against the State of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, nor against its people. Whatever the differences amongst the citizens of the FRY, and the differences they may have with other nations, I believe that they will expect their leaders who have abused their trust, to come to The Hague to respond to these accusations.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT- 99-37-I


BEFORE A JUDGE OF THE TRIBUNAL

Before: Judge David Hunt

Registrar: Mrs. Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh

Date filed: 23 May 1999



THE PROSECUTOR

v.

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
MILAN MILUTINOVIC
NIKOLA SAINOVIC
DRAGOLJUB OJDANOVIC
VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC

_______________________________________________________

PRESENTATION OF AN INDICTMENT FOR REVIEW
AND APPLICATION FOR WARRANTS OF ARREST
AND FOR RELATED ORDERS

_________________________________________________________

The Office of the Prosecutor

Louise Arbour, Prosecutor



THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Case No. IT-99-37-I



THE PROSECUTOR

v.

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
MILAN MILUTINOVIC
NIKOLA SAINOVIC
DRAGOLJUB OJDANOVIC
VLAJKO STOJILJKOVIC



I, Louise Arbour, Prosecutor, pursuant to my authority under Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, having determined that there is sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that the abovenamed persons have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, forward herewith an indictment against them, together with the attached supporting material, for confirmation by a Judge of the Tribunal.

This indictment is the first in the history of this Tribunal to charge a Head of State during an on-going armed conflict with the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law. Bringing the accused to trial will therefore raise enforcement issues not hitherto encountered by this institution. Accordingly, I request that, upon confirmation, a number of specific orders be made concerning arrest warrants, the delayed public disclosure of the indictment, and the seizure of assets.

1. First, I ask that, pursuant to Rule 55, an order be made that a certified copy of the warrant of arrest for each of the accused be transmitted by the Registrar to the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to Mr. Zoran Knezevic, Federal Minister of Justice, Belgrade. In the situation where the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and senior government and military officials stand accused of crimes requiring that they be taken into custody and transferred to the International Tribunal for trial, I consider that the most appropriate course of action is to address the certified copies of the warrants to the Federal Minister of Justice.

2. Second, although each of the accused resides in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that is where they were last known to be and are likely to be found, I also request that an order be made, pursuant to Rule 55(D), that certified copies of each of the said warrants be transmitted by the Registrar to all States. I consider this necessary because it is reasonable to believe that, upon indictment, some or all of the accused may attempt to seek refuge outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These accused should be subject to immediate arrest and transfer to the Tribunal, regardless of where they may try to go. The same order should instruct the Registrar also to transmit certified copies of each of the said warrants to the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL).

3. Third, I request that an order be made pursuant to Rules 53(A), 53(C), 54 and 55(D), that (a) there be no public disclosure of the indictment and arrest warrants until 12 noon (The Hague time) on Thursday, 27 May 1999, subject to the notification by the Prosecutor to appropriate authorities as discussed below; (b) that the transmission by the Registrar of certified copies of the said warrants also be delayed until 12 noon (The Hague time) on Thursday, 27 May 1999; and (c) that there be no public disclosure of the supporting materials, the Review of the Indictment or the present Application until the arrest of the accused.

4. Finally, I request that an order be made under Rule 54, that each State make enquiries to discover whether any of the accused have assets located in their territory, and that any State finding such assets adopt provisional measures to freeze such assets, without prejudice to the rights of third parties, until the accused are taken into custody.

5. In relation to my third request listed above, the accused in this indictment are leaders occupying some of the highest positions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. Together and individually they have enormous power over the territory and resources and have all the apparatus of State control at their disposal. They may have power and influence beyond the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Their reaction to the publication of this indictment is unpredictable. A number of my staff are active in the region. They and others are currently exposed to the risk of intimidation or reprisals. In particular, a United Nations Mission, which includes a member of my staff known to the Yugoslav authorities, is presently in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on a fact-finding mission. This mission is scheduled to depart the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at 08:00 hours on Thursday, 27 May 1999. Other United Nations agencies, governments, and humanitarian agencies from the international community have many staff dealing with refugees and displaced persons at or near the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The publication of this indictment may have security implications for them. A delay in publication until 12 noon on that date, however, will allow my Office, and others, to take steps to minimise these risks.

6. In relation to my final request listed above, the indictment alleges that, on a large scale, property was unlawfully taken from homes of the victims, and that many victims were robbed of money and other valuables. The destination of this property is presently unknown, but my investigations will continue in order to attempt to establish whether the accused obtained such property or proceeds.

7. Rule 98 ter provides that if a Trial Chamber finds the accused guilty of a crime and concludes from the evidence that unlawful taking of property was associated with it, a Trial Chamber shall make a specific finding to that effect in its judgement. Rule 105 makes provision for the restitution of the property or the proceeds thereof, and allows a Trial Chamber to order provisional measures for the preservation and protection of the property or proceeds, including property or proceeds in the hands of third parties not otherwise connected with the crime of which the convicted person has been found guilty. At an earlier stage of proceedings, Rule 61(D) makes similar provision for a Trial Chamber to order States to take provisional measures to freeze the assets of the accused, without prejudice to the rights of third parties.

8. Moreover, Rules 39 and 54, which deal with the making of orders by a Judge of the Tribunal, are worded in general terms, and place no limit on the types of order that may be made. Provisional measures are designed to protect the ability of the Tribunal ultimately to do justice in the case. They are by their nature temporary, and do not permanently divest accused persons of their assets. It therefore appears appropriate for provisional measures to freeze assets to be available to a single Judge of the Tribunal. Further, it may be thought logical for such measures to be available to the Tribunal at an early stage in proceedings, when the accused are still at large, and when, in the full knowledge that they are indicted, they are in a position both to use their assets to escape being arrested and brought to justice, and to take steps to disperse or otherwise dispose of their assets in an attempt to disguise them or place them beyond the reach of the Tribunal. Although no express provision is made in the Rules for such an order by a single Judge of the Tribunal, the principle of the freezing of assets of an accused is an accepted part of the procedure of the Tribunal, a step regarded as necessary to preserve the Tribunal’s ability to impose the penalties set out in Article 24 of the Statute. In all the circumstances, I therefore consider it appropriate to request an order locating and freezing any assets of the accused in this case.

9. In accordance with existing practice, I attach proposed drafts of the orders sought.



_____________________

Louise Arbour

Prosecutor

Dated this twenty second day of May 1999

At The Hague

The Netherlands


BEFORE A JUDGE OF A TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge David Hunt

Registrar: Mrs Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh

Decision of: 24 May 1999



PROSECUTOR

v

Slobodan MILOSEVIC, Milan MILUTINOVIC, Nikola SAINOVIC,
Dragoljub OJDANIC & Vlajko STOJILJKOVIC

_____________________________________________________

DECISION ON REVIEW OF INDICTMENT
AND APPLICATION FOR CONSEQUENTIAL ORDERS

____________________________________________________

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Louise Arbour, Prosecutor



I Introduction

1. Pursuant to Article 19 of the International Tribunal’s Statute and Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Prosecutor has submitted for review an indictment naming Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic and Vlajko Stojiljkovic. Each of the accused is charged with crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 5 of the Statute, involving persecution, deportation and murder. Murder is also charged against each accused as a violation of the laws or customs of war, in accordance with Article 3 of the Statute, on the basis that it is recognised as such by common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.



II Review and Confirmation of the Indictment

2. The indictment comes before me as a judge of a Trial Chamber, in accordance with Articles 18 and 19 of the Statute. Article 19 provides that if, after such review of the indictment, I am satisfied that a prima facie case has been established by the Prosecutor, I am to confirm the indictment. Rule 47(E) requires me, for the purpose of confirming the indictment, to examine also any supporting material which the Prosecutor may forward pursuant to Rule 47(B). The purpose of Rule 47(E) is not to permit the supporting material to fill in any gaps which may exist in the material facts pleaded in the indictment1. It is to ensure that there is evidence to support the material facts so pleaded, so that the confirming judge is acting, in effect, as a grand jury (or a committing magistrate) in the common law system or as a juge d’instruction in some civil law systems.2

3. The joint operation of Article 19 and Rule 47(E) is, therefore, that I must be satisfied that the material facts pleaded in the indictment establish a prima facie case and that there is evidence available which supports those material facts. The structure of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence makes it clear that the confirming judge is concerned only with the substance of the indictment, and not with its form.3

4. A prima facie case on any particular charge exists in this situation where the material facts pleaded in the indictment constitute a credible case which would (if not contradicted by the accused) be a sufficient basis to convict him of that charge.4

5. The events upon which the indictment is based are alleged to have taken place in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo in the southern part of the Republic of Serbia, a constituent republic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, between 1 January and late April 1999. At the commencement of that period, almost 90% of the population of that Province was Albanian, and the remainder were Serbs.

6. The military forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the police force of Serbia, some police units from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and associated paramilitary units are alleged during that period to have engaged, in concert, in a widespread and systematic series of offensives against many predominately Kosovo Albanian towns and villages. The general pattern of the offensive was that Kosovo Albanian residents of these towns and villages were ordered to leave their homes, upon threats of death. After they left, the property they had left behind was stolen and their homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable by fire. They were forced to join convoys of similarly displaced Kosovo Albanians on route to the borders between Kosovo and neighbouring countries. They were physically mistreated. In many instances, the Kosovo Albanian men who had been displaced were separated from the women and children and they were killed. At the border, the property they had with them was stolen, including their identification papers and motor vehicles. In some cases, the villages were initially shelled and Kosovo Albanians were killed in the shelling.

7. These forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia are also alleged to have deliberately shot and killed unarmed Kosovo Albanians, including women and children, on a number of occasions during this period. This happened at the villages of Racak (where fortyfive Kosovo Albanians were killed), Velika Krusa (where 105 Kosovo Albanians were killed and their bodies burnt), Izbica (where 130 Kosovo Albanians were killed) and other villages. It is alleged that approximately 740,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians were forcibly deported from Kosovo, and that approximately 385 identified Kosovo Albanians were murdered.

8. The indictment alleges that these operations targeting Kosovo Albanians were undertaken with the objective of removing a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from Kosovo, in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the Province. If these pleaded facts are accepted, they establish that the forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia persecuted the Kosovo Albanian civilian population on political, racial or religious grounds, and that there was both deportation and murder, constituting crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.

9. The five accused are alleged to be criminally responsible for the actions of those forces upon two bases –

(a) their individual responsibility, having planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted their planning, preparation or execution (Article 7.1), and

(b) in relation to four of them (the accused Sainovic being excepted), their superior authority, having known or had reason to know that their subordinates were about to commit such acts or had done so but having failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish those subordinates who did those acts (Article 7.3).

The subordinates were the members of the military forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the police force of Serbia, the police units from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the associated paramilitary units. The case against each of the accused is built upon both their legal and their de facto relationship with those forces.

10. During the relevant period, the military forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were under the control of, inter alia –

(1) The accused Milosevic, as the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (known as the VJ) with the power to implement the National Defence Plan decided by the Supreme Defence Council in compliance with the decisions of that Council (of which he was the President).

(2) The accused Milutinovic, as the President of Serbia and as such a member of the Supreme Defence Council, participating in the decisions concerning the activities of the VJ.

(3) The accused Ojdanic, as Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, with the power to command the VJ as required.

11. During the relevant period (or a substantial part thereof), the police force of Serbia was under the control of, inter alia –

(1) The accused Milosevic, as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, having command authority of republic and federal police units subordinated to the VJ during a declared state of imminent threat of war or a declared state of war. (A declaration of a state of imminent threat of war was proclaimed on 23 March 1999, and of a state of war the next day.)

(2) The accused Milutinovic, as the President of Serbia with power, during a declared state of imminent threat of war or a declared state of war, to enact measures for the governance of the republic.

(3) The accused Stojiljkovic, as Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, and responsible for the enforcement of the laws of the republic, including the activities of the police.

12. During the relevant period (or a substantial part thereof), the police units from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were under the control of, inter alia , the accused Milosevic, for the reasons set out in the last paragraph. He also exercised an extensive de facto control over both federal and Serbian institutions (including the police) nominally within the competence of the respective Governments or Assemblies.

13. During the relevant period, the paramilitary units worked in association with, and in concert with, the other forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, and at their direction.

14. In addition, during the relevant period the accused Milosevic was the primary person on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia with whom the international community had negotiated in the continuing conflict in the Balkans, as he had been since 1989, including the negotiations with representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) conducted in October 1998, from which an "Agreement on OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission" was signed on 16 October 1998. The accused Milutinovic was also a significant person with whom the international community had negotiated, as he had been since 1995, and he had been present at the international negotiations for peace in Kosovo held at Rambouillet, France, in February 1999.

15. Although the accused Sainovic has not been charged with superior authority, it is significant that, as Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, he was designated by the accused Milosevic as his representative in relation to the Kosovo situation. Diplomats and other international officials were directed to speak to him concerning that subject. He signed the "Clark-Naumann agreement" in October 1998, which provided for the partial withdrawal of forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia from Kosovo, a limitation on the introduction of additional forces and equipment into the area, and the deployment of unarmed OSCE verifiers. He was a member of the Serbian delegation to the negotiations at Rambouillet. As with most cases where an accused is charged with both individual responsibility (not including the actual commission of the crimes himself) and superior authority, the relationship of the accused to those who did commit those crimes is directly relevant to the issue whether he did plan, instigate, order or otherwise aid and abet in the planning, preparation or execution of those crimes. The absence of any legal relationship between the accused Sainovic and those persons in the present case no doubt explains why he has not been charged with superior authority, but it does not detract from the issue of his individual responsibility in the circumstances outlined in this paragraph.

16. This has been a very brief outline of what I understand to be the prosecution case. The supporting material is very much more detailed than may be suggested by that outline.

17. After reviewing and considering the indictment and the supporting material forwarded by the Prosecutor, and after hearing the Prosecutor in person, I am satisfied that the material facts pleaded establish a prima facie case in respect of each and every count of the indictment and that there is evidence available which supports those material facts. I am satisfied that the requirements of Article 19 and Rule 47 have been complied with. Accordingly, I confirm the indictment submitted for review.



III Consequential orders

18. The Prosecutor seeks a number of consequential orders. Article 19 provides that, if requested by the Prosecutor to do so, I may issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons, or such other orders, as may be required for the conduct of the trial.

(a) Execution of arrest warrants

19. Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge confirming it may issue an arrest warrant,5 and such warrant must include an order for the prompt transfer of the accused to the Tribunal upon his or their arrest.6 A certified copy of the arrest warrant is then transmitted by the Registrar to, inter alia, the national authorities of the State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction resides, or was last known to be or is believed by the Registrar to be likely to be found.7

20. In the present case, the Prosecutor seeks an order that the warrants of arrest of the accused be transmitted by the Registrar to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to Mr Zoran Knezevic, Federal Minister of Justice, Belgrade. As the accused Milosevic is the Head of State of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and as the other accused are senior government and military figures of the Federal Republic, the Prosecutor says, the Federal Minister of Justice is the most appropriate person in authority in the Federal Republic to execute those warrants. I agree. I accept that such an order should be made in this case.

21. In the light of the possibility that some or all of the accused may seek refuge outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Prosecutor also seeks an order, pursuant to Rule 55(D), that certified copies of each of the warrants are to be transmitted by the Registrar to all States Members of the United Nations and to the Confederation of Switzerland.

22. Rule 61(D) permits the issue of international arrest warrants to be transmitted to all such States, but only where the arrest warrant issued pursuant to Rule 55 has not been executed within a reasonable time, and such international warrants may be issued only by a Trial Chamber. It is nevertheless argued that the power to transmit certified copies of the arrest warrant pursuant to Rule 55(D) is a wide one, and that it is expressly not limited to transmission only to those national authorities of the States or territories where the accused resides or is believed to reside. In any event, it is argued, the procedure permitted by Rule 55(D) of transmitting certified copies of the original arrest warrant is not the same as the issue of international arrest warrants pursuant to Rule 61(D). Rule 54 permits a judge of the Tribunal to issue such orders as may be necessary for the purposes of the preparation or conduct of the trial. There can be no trial until the accused is arrested. The orders sought would assist in ensuring the arrest of the accused.

23. I accept the Prosecutor’s argument, and that the order sought pursuant to Rule 55(D) should be made in this case. States Members of the United Nations are bound to comply without undue delay with any order of the Tribunal for the arrest or detention of any person,8 but it is not suggested that the Confederation of Switzerland is similarly bound. The transmission of the certified copy of the warrants to be sent to the Confederation of Switzerland should therefore be expressed in terms of a request for assistance rather than an order.

24. For the same reason, the Prosecutor seeks a similar order that certified copies of the arrest warrant are to be transmitted by the Registrar to the Prosecutor herself so that she may use those certified copies to seek the assistance of the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), pursuant to Rule 39, by circulating those certified copies under its "Red Notice" procedure. Again, I accept that such an order should be made in this case.

25. Because of the sheer bulk involved in transmitting the certified copies of the arrest warrants to all those nominated if, as Rule 55(C) would otherwise require, each arrest warrant must be accompanied by a certified copy of the indictment and the statement of the accused’s rights translated into a language understood by the accused, I order pursuant to Rule 55(D) that the arrest warrants need no be so accompanied in this case.

(b) Freezing the assets of the accused

26. The Prosecutor seeks orders that each of the States Members of the United Nations –

(i) make inquiries to discover whether any of the accused have assets located in their territory, and

(ii) if any such assets are found, adopt provisional measures to freeze those assets, without prejudice to the rights of third parties, until the accused are taken into custody.

It is pointed out that the indictment alleges that property was unlawfully taken from the homes of victims and that many victims were robbed of money and other valuables.

27. The application was initially based solely upon Rule 54, which gives power to a judge (as well as to a Trial Chamber) to issue such orders as may be necessary for the preparation or conduct of the trial. As earlier stated, there can be no trial until the accused is arrested – so, the argument went, any order which assists in ensuring the arrest of the accused may be made by a judge pursuant to Rule 54. Freezing the assets of the accused, the Prosecutor submitted, may be done for two distinct purposes – for the purpose of granting restitution of property or payment from its proceeds (which may be ordered by a Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 105 after conviction, subject to appropriate findings having been made in the judgment pursuant to Rule 98ter), and also for the purpose of preventing an accused who is still at large from using those assets to evade arrest and from taking steps to disguise his assets or putting them beyond the reach of the Tribunal.

28. The apparent width of the powers given to a judge by Rule 54, however, may perhaps be somewhat limited by the fact that Rule 61(D) gives power to a Trial Chamber (but not to a judge) to grant such relief for the same reasons at a slightly later stage, where the arrest warrant has not been executed within a reasonable time. But no such limitation can be placed upon the power given to the confirming judge by Article 19.2 of the Statute in much the same terms as Rule 54, and incorporated in Rule 47(H)(i). The application then proceeded upon the basis of Article 19.2.

29. In the situation where the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has consistently, in breach of its legal obligations, ignored the Tribunal’s orders to arrest persons who have been indicted to stand trial before the Tribunal, and who are living within its territory, and where the Tribunal has no police force of its own to execute its warrants, I accept that it is of the utmost importance that every permissible step be taken which will assist in effecting the arrest of those who shelter in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or who otherwise seek to evade arrest. I agree that the orders sought should be made in this case.

(c) A non-disclosure order

30. Lastly, the Prosecutor has sought orders –

(i) pursuant to Rules 54 and 55(D), that the transmission of the warrants and certified copies thereof be delayed until 12 noon (The Hague time) on Thursday, 27 May 1999;

(ii) pursuant to Rule 53, that there be no disclosure of the indictment, the accompanying material or the confirmation and orders made until the same time, subject to certain nominated exceptions; and

(iii) also pursuant to Rule 53, that there be no disclosure of the supporting material forwarded by her pursuant to Rule 47(B) until the arrest of all the accused.

Rule 55(D) makes the transmission by the Registrar of certified copies of the arrest warrants for execution subject to any order of a judge of a Trial Chamber. Rule 54 gives power to a judge of Trial Chamber to make such orders as may be necessary for the preparation of the trial. Rule 53 limits the power of the Tribunal to make an order for non-disclosure to where there are exceptional circumstances and where it is in the interests of justice that the order be made. Such orders for non-disclosure are usually sought and made where the disclosure of the indictment would enable the accused named in it to take steps to evade arrest.

31. The Prosecutor has put forward a number of reasons which are said to justify the first and second orders being made. The availability of both orders may be considered together.

32. I accept that the various accused in this case hold the highest positions of power within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia and that, together and individually, they wield enormous power over their territories and their resources, with all the apparatus of State at their disposal. I also accept that their reaction to the indictment is unpredictable. I accept too that a number of the Prosecutor’s staff are active in the area over which the accused exert such enormous power and that they would be exposed to the serious risk of reprisals and intimidation if the indictment is disclosed immediately. I consider that the need to give an opportunity to the Office of the Prosecutor to minimise those risks is a legitimate consideration in determining whether it is in the interests of justice to make a non-disclosure order for the short period sought.

33. The same is true of the serious risk of reprisals and intimidation against many other persons within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or at or near to its borders – the United Nations Mission presently there on a fact-finding mission and the staffs there of other United Nations and Governmental agencies and of the humanitarian agencies from the international community dealing with refugees and displaced persons – as well as such risk against the personnel of various Governments presently engaged there and elsewhere in seeking a resolution of the current armed conflict. The disclosure of the indictment would have serious security implications for all of them which can be reduced, and hopefully minimised, if there is a short delay in the disclosure of the indictment to enable precautionary measures to be taken.

34. It is clearly in the interests of justice that there be a delay in the disclosure of the indictment and the other documents to enable steps to be taken to protect all of these people from the risk of such reprisals. There could be no doubt that all these circumstances are exceptional.

35. No submission has been made that the impact of such disclosure on the current attempts to resolve the armed conflict in the Kosovo Province is a relevant matter to be considered in determining whether it is in the interests of justice to order non-disclosure. The safety of those personnel involved in the attempts to resolve that armed conflict is a legitimate consideration in relation to the interests of justice, but the possible political and diplomatic consequences of the indictment are not the same thing. There is a clear and substantial distinction to be drawn between what may be relevant to the well known and accepted discretion of prosecuting authorities as to whether an indictment should be presented and what may be relevant to this Tribunal’s discretion as to whether an order should be made for the non-disclosure of that indictment once it has been presented and confirmed. In view of the opinion which I have already expressed, that a non-disclosure order for a short period is justified to enable security measures to be taken in relation to those at risk of intimidation or reprisals, it is unnecessary for me to determine whether the impact of the public disclosure of the indictment upon the peace process itself is also a consideration which is relevant to the exercise of my discretion to make a non-disclosure order pursuant to Rule 53. It is sufficient for me to say that such impact is not a matter which I have considered in determining the application made for non-disclosure in this case.

36. The Prosecutor has informed me that the United Nations Mission is presently scheduled to depart from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at 8.00 am on Thursday, 27 May. The limit on the public non-disclosure order until 12 noon on that day was suggested as an appropriate one in the light of that fact. I accept that an order for that period of time (just short of seventytwo hours) is reasonable in this case. I also accept that it is reasonable for the Prosecutor herself, in her discretion, to notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Governments whose personnel or staff are at risk of reprisals or intimidation of the presentation and confirmation of the indictment and the issue of the arrest warrants, so that precautionary security measures may be taken for the safety of those so at risk (including the staff of the humanitarian agencies earlier referred to). I will make such orders accordingly.

37. As to the third order sought – that there be no disclosure of the accompanying material until the arrest of all the accused, the Prosecutor says that the enormous power which the accused, together and individually, wield over the territories in which many of the witnesses still live puts those witnesses in grave danger of physical harm if they are identified before all of the accused are arrested. I am prepared to make such an order at this stage. It may need to be varied if one or more but not all of the accused are arrested, when steps might be devised at that stage for the protection of the identity of the witnesses so that the accused who have been arrested can be made aware of the case against them.



IV Disposition

38. For the foregoing reasons,

1. I confirm each count of the indictment submitted by the Prosecutor against each accused.

2. I make the following orders:

(1) That certified copies of the warrants of arrest for each accused be transmitted by the Registrar to –

(a) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to Mr Zoran Knezevic, Federal Minister of Justice, Belgrade;

(b) all States Members of the United Nations;

(c) the Confederation of Switzerland; and

(d) the Prosecutor,

as soon as practicable after 12 noon (The Hague time) on Thursday, 27 May 1999, but not before, unless otherwise ordered.

(2) That the Registrar is not required to have a copy of the indictment or a statement of the rights of the accused accompany the certified copies of the warrants transmitted in accordance with the previous order.

(3) That, with the exception that the Prosecutor may, in her discretion, notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Governments whose personnel or staff are at risk of reprisals or intimidation, there be no disclosure of the indictment, the review and confirmation of the indictment, the arrest warrants or the Prosecutor’s application dated 22 May 1999 during the period ending at 12 noon (The Hague time) on Thursday, 27 May 1999, unless otherwise ordered.

(4) That there be no disclosure of the supporting material forwarded by the Prosecutor pursuant to Rule 47(B) until the arrest of all of the accused.

(5) That all States Members of the United Nations make inquiries to discover whether the accused (or any of them) have assets located in their territory and, if so, adopt provisional measures to freeze such assets, without prejudice to the rights of third parties, until the accused are taken into custody.

3. I grant liberty to apply to me without further formal application for any variation of the orders made, at any time prior to 12 noon on Thursday, 27 May 1999.



Done in English and French, the English version being authoritative.

Dated this 24th day of May 1999

At The Hague

The Netherlands

____________________________

Judge David Hunt

[Seal of the Tribunal]

---

1. Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Case IT-97-25-PT, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of the Indictment, 24 Feb 1999, at para 15.
2. Prosecutor v Kordic, Case IT-95-14-I, Decision on the Review of the Indictment, 10 Nov 1995 (Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald), at p 3.
3. Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Case IT-97-25-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Response to Decision of 24 February 1999, 20 May 1999, at para 11 footnote 11. Rule 72(A) gives to the Trial Chamber the jurisdiction to deal with the form of the indictment.
4. Prosecutor v Kordic, Case IT-95-14-I, Decision on the Review of the Indictment, 10 Nov 1995 (Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald), at p 3, adopting the Report of the International Law Commission, UN Document A/49/10 (1994), at 95.
5. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 47(H).
6. Rule 55(A).
7. Rule 55(D).
8. Statute, Article 29.2.

http://www.un.org/icty/special/index.html

To Afroditis.

I only try to make claer to everyone, pro or contra Milosevic, a few things. The most important ones are:

1 Milosevic is a dictator who oppresses 'his' people.
2There is no such fhing as freedom in Serbia, for instance: no freedom of movement, no freedom of speech, no right to assembly.
3All deaths are tragedies, but it is also very important to notice the torture and rape and mass killing committed by the Serb forces, because it happens on such large scale.
4Just as Natos bombings are no fiction, genocide, or 'ethnic cleansing' is no fiction either.

For the other things you mention, I don't mention them, because they have nothing to do with the tragedy in Kosova. If you can tell me how they connect, I would be glad to hear. If you are trying to say, European, and other countues are not clean either, I agree with you, but I said that already a zillion times. No country is clean, neither Turkey, nor Greece, nor any country.

Zoja